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 On Saturday, the Iranian government admitted that its armed forces inadvertently targeted Ukraine 
International Airlines flight PS752. An unexamined question in this tragedy is whether Iran violated 
international humanitarian law (IHL) by targeting the plane, and could the downing of the aircraft even 
be considered a war crime? If the information we have so far is accurate and the plane was indeed 
shot down by mistake (which I will assume for the purpose of this analysis), Iran most likely violated 
the law of armed conflict but did not commit a war crime. 
Was there an international armed conflict? If so, where? 
The legal classification of the plane downing depends on whether there was an armed conflict at the 
relevant time, a necessary condition for the application of IHL and the rules that legal regime applies 
to targeting. The attack on the plane occurred on early Wednesday, January 8, approximately four 
hours after Iran carried out missile strikes on two airbases housing United States forces in Iraq which 
was in response to the killing of Soleimani earlier that week. Shortly after takeoff in Teheran, an 
Iranian short-range missile hit the Ukrainian passenger jet, killing all 176 people on board. Did the 
preceding military engagements trigger application of IHL? 
Common article 2 to the Geneva Conventions is the starting point stating that IHL applies in “armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war 
is not recognized by one of them.” It is reasonable to conclude that the downing of the plane took 
place in the context of an international armed conflict (IAC) involving Iran and the United States and, 
therefore, IHL applied on Iranian territory. This might seem trite, but it is not. According to Gabor 
Rona, it is a “questionable assertion.”* 
First, the counterstrike by Iran against the military bases in Iraq took place within the context of an 
IAC between Iran and the United States. The counterstrike was part of a situation in which one or 
more states had recourse to armed force against another state, a settled definition of an armed 
conflict. There are difficulties as to the applicability of IHL at the lower threshold of IAC, be it the 
“border incursions problem” or the “first strike problem.” The ICRC Commentary affirms the 
applicability of IHL as soon as two or more states use any level of armed force against each other 
(para 243). Given the recent recourse of some states to targeted killings abroad, many have 
cautioned against affirming the applicability of IHL too quickly given the negative impact this can have 
on the protection of the right to life, as is outlined in an article by Agnes Callamard or as participants 
at a 2015 ICRC panel discussed. Taking the applicability of IHL for granted can also lead to a further 
erosion of the prohibition of the use of force in interstate relations by entangling two separate 
enquiries – interstate use of force and targeted killings – from three distinct branches of international 
law into a single one, as explained by Anthony Dworkin. Yet, on January 8, IHL was, in my view, 
clearly applicable. Iran responded militarily to previous armed activity by another state against one of 
its high-ranking officials. The reasons why an intensity and organizational threshold exists in non-
international armed conflicts, when state authority is challenged internally, do not exist in international 
armed conflicts. For IHL to be effective on the ground, where the benefit of hindsight is not available, 
the applicability of IHL to situations such as the Iranian counterstrike must be affirmed. 
What about the second issue concerning the territorial applicability of IHL? Contrary to non-
international armed conflicts, the geographical applicability of IHL is relatively uncontroversial in IAC. 
IHL applies to the entire territory of the parties and to all activities linked to the armed conflict. In this 
IAC, Iran is undoubtedly a party to the conflict and the downing of the plane is linked to the conflict, 
therefore, IHL applied to the targeting of the aircraft even if the rest of the armed confrontation was 
deliberately aimed at facilities on Iraqi territory. 
Was the downing of the aircraft a war crime? 
Let us now consider the consequences of having established the applicability of IHL. The Ukrainian 
passenger jet is undoubtedly a civilian object. Deliberately targeting it would have been a war crime, 
but that is hopefully not what is at stake. What is at stake is the alleged error of fact by Iran, i.e. the 
information that Iran misidentified the plane as an enemy cruise missile. Even if we assign the mental 
state of recklessness to war crimes, the Iranian action appears not to cross the threshold. 
In an article on NBC, Gabor Rona asserted that “if the attack was undertaken without  sufficient  
precautions to make sure the target was a military object, that too could be a war crime.”** In an 
article on NBC, Gabor Rona asserted that “if the attack was undertaken without  sufficient  precautions 
to make sure the target was a military object, that too could be a war crime.”* But violation of the rules 
that require states to take precautions are not sufficient to establish criminal liability. To what extent 
war crimes can be committed recklessly has been discussed extensively before the ICTY (e.g. in the 
Blaskic case), as Ralph Janík has pointed out, but under the Statute of the ICC, the relevant war 
crime explicitly requires proof that attacks were “intentionally directed” at a civilian object. Even under 
customary law, it would be necessary to show that the perpetrator at least knew that the plane was 
likely not a military object (awareness of the substantial risk). Unless significant new information is 
released, the downing of the Ukrainian aircraft did not meet the threshold for war crimes. 
[Editor’s note: For more on this topic, see Ryan Goodman, “Explainer: What Mental State is Required 
to Commit a War Crime?”] 
Precautions: Was Iran obliged to close the airspace? And what about the apparently lost 
transponder signal?  
IHL is much more than a list of war crimes. Inadvertently shooting down a passenger jet can still be a 
violation of IHL. Acts of negligence in targeting can amount to IHL violations and state responsibility 
for the behavior of officials who carried out the strike. And a belligerent’s failure to take precautions to 
safeguard the lives of civilians—as outlined in article 57 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions (which also applies as customary law)—are IHL violations too. 
Based on the information available today, it is most likely that Iran committed an IHL violation. Each 
party to the armed conflict has an obligation to take precautions to protect civilians before and during 
attacks. There are well-established and uncontroversial customary international law rules that 
required Iran to take constant care “to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects” as 
well as to “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor 
civilian objects” (as codified in article 57 of Additional Protocol I). 
What did these rules imply in the concrete situation? Tehran airport is near an Iranian military base. 
The authorities apparently discussed whether to close the airspace to civilian planes, but this was not 
done, probably in order to avoid giving the impression that Iran was expecting counterattacks. IHL 
does not explicitly require belligerent parties to close the airspace to civilian planes during or shortly 
after planned aerial attacks. But by taking a conscious decision against the closure of the airspace, 
the Iranian armed forces confirm that they were aware of the potential of civilian airplanes in the 
wrong place and time. Instead of closing the airspace, there might have been other (but admittedly 
more limited) ways to take precautions (e.g. by increasing the capacity and monitoring of the 
communications channels between civilian air traffic control and the military forces or perhaps 
diverting civilian routes further away from the Iranian military sites). According to the New York Times, 
the transponder signal of the aircraft disappeared before the missile hit the plane, for reasons that 
seem yet unknown but could well be unrelated to the political and military context. Even if the decision 
to target the object was taken after the loss of the signal, this does not necessarily mean that the 
object became immediately unidentifiable as a civilian plane. According to the ICRC’s customary IHL 
study, “[m]ilitary commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or executing attacks 
necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all 
sources which is available to them at the relevant time,” thus including civilian air traffic information. A 
civilian airplane signal disappearing should hopefully not have gone unnoticed by civilian air traffic 
control and intermittent or faulty transponder signals are not unheard of. According to one report, “the 
U.S. government has intelligence indicating that Iranians quickly learned they’d made a mistake by 
downing the plane …. That includes intercepts indicating that civil aviation officials in Iran knew the 
plane should not have been a military target.” In any event, in case of doubt, an object must always 
be presumed civilian (art. 52(3) AP I) and there were many reasons to be doubtful. Unless Iran can 
present evidence on the precautions that were taken, the mistake is a violation of humanitarian law. 
As with many other violations of IHL, one with terribly sad consequences for all the families and 
friends of those killed. 
* Gabor Rona provided the following clarification following publication of this article: “The questionable 
assertion was whether Iran deemed itself at war. Iran has not, to my knowledge, asserted IHL as the 
basis of any of its uses of force, following the Suleimani drone strike. I was not expressing my own 
belief concerning application of IHL. I do believe that the US drone strike is a jus ad bellum violation 
and that, unfortunately, it triggers application of IHL. I agree with you that Iran’s position, like a 
declaration of war or its absence, is irrelevant to the determination of whether an armed conflict 
exists” (reproduced with Rona’s permission). 
** Editor’s note: This Just Security article originally read, “In an article on NBC, Gabor Rona asserted 
incorrectly, that ‘if the attack was undertaken without  sufficient  precautions to make sure the target 
was a military object, that too would be a war crime.’” After publication, the NBC piece was changed 
from “would” to “could,” and this article by Schmid was accordingly revised. 
Photo: An Iranian woman walks beneath a poster honoring the victims of a Ukrainian 
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